

Individual transnationalism, globalisation and euroscepticism: An empirical test of Deutsch's transactionalist theory

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Abstract. Recent trends of mass-level euroscepticism seriously challenge Deutsch's transactionalist theory that increased transnational interactions trigger support for further political integration. While transnational interactions have indeed proliferated, public support for European integration has diminished. This article aims to solve this puzzle by arguing that transnational interaction is highly stratified across society. Its impact on EU support therefore only applies to a small portion of the public. The rest of the population not only fails to be prompted to support the integration process, but may see it as a threat to their realm. This is even more the case as, parallel to European integration, global trends of integration create tensions in national societies. The following hypotheses are proposed: first, the more transnational an individual, the less she or he is prone to be eurosceptical; and second, this effect is more pronounced in countries that are more globalised. A multilevel ordinal logit analysis of survey data from the 2006 Eurobarometer wave 65.1 confirms these hypotheses.

Keywords: European integration; euroscepticism; globalisation; multilevel analysis; transnationalism

By the creation of a common market and the opening up of national borders, European integration has spurred a wide range of new economic, political and social opportunities beyond the nation-state (Fligstein 2008). European citizens are free to obtain their academic degree in Germany, earn their money in London, invest it in Luxembourg and retire to Spain. In other words, Europeans now have access to a wide array of new resources beyond the nation-state. It is essentially this development that Karl W. Deutsch's transactionalist approach expected to trigger support for the integration of supranational 'security communities' such as the European Union (EU) (Deutsch et al. 1957, 1967). According to Deutsch and his colleagues, increased economic and political cooperation between states facilitates cross-border transactions amongst their citizens, who in turn establish a sense of community and legitimate further integration (Deutsch et al. 1957).

Albeit a prominent 'pre-theory' of European integration (Haas 1970), the relation between transnational interactions and EU support has not been tested empirically with respect to the European Union today. This is surprising

for two reasons. First, the evident proliferation of cross-border interactions and networks among the European public in the last two decades (Díez-Medrano 2008; Büttner & Mau 2010) renders transactionalist theory extremely relevant to scholarly research on attitudes towards European integration. Second, in contrast to transactionalist assertions, this proliferation does not seem to go hand in hand with growing mass support for European integration. To the contrary, an increasingly eurosceptic¹ public (see, amongst others, Eichenberg & Dalton 2007; Hooghe & Marks 2009; Lubbers & Scheepers 2010) challenges the optimistic outlook of transactionalist theory, especially since the Maastricht Treaty.

This article aims to solve this puzzle by arguing that the transactionalist hypothesis does in fact have its merits but faces two main challenges in today's Europe. First, transnational interaction is highly stratified across society. Only a minority interacts across borders, while the overwhelming majority remains – completely or mainly – within the boundaries of their nation-state (Fligstein 2008; Büttner & Mau 2010). Thus, the transactionalist hypothesis only applies to a small, elite group of the public, while most Europeans are not prompted by transnational interaction to endorse the integration process. Second, Deutsch did not foresee that, parallel to European integration, European societies would witness global market integration and with it, increased economic uncertainty and competition, massive immigration flows and other processes that 'put the national political community under strain' (Kriesi 2009: 222). This not only creates tensions in society, but also waters down the legitimacy of European integration and may mask the impact of transnationalism on EU support at the individual level.

While important contributions have been made to analyse the relationship between transnational interactions and European identity (Fligstein 2008) or cosmopolitan attitudes (Mau et al. 2008), transactionalist theory has not been tested *directly* and across European Member States. Consequently, the contribution of this article is twofold. First, it measures the extent of individual transnationalism across European society, capturing individuals' transnational background, their transnational practices and their transnational human capital. Second, it analyses the interplay between globalisation and individual transnationalism and its impact on euroscepticism. Following transactionalist theory, it is hypothesised that individuals that are more transnational are less prone to oppose the integration process. People willing and able to engage in cross-border interaction and mobility are likely to welcome European integration as a new source of opportunities. They are also more likely to subscribe to cosmopolitan attitudes. In contrast, individuals who do not interact beyond the borders of their home country might see these transformations as threats rather than opportunities and could develop

eurosceptic attitudes. On the macro level, globalisation is expected to intervene as a contextual effect that works as an amplifier of the individual effect. Therefore, the individual relationship is hypothesised to be even stronger in countries that are more exposed to globalisation. In this view, mass-level euroscepticism seems to be a corollary of the processes of globalisation and regional integration.

The article is organised as follows. First, it lays out the conceptual framework and the guiding hypotheses. Second, the data and operationalisations used are presented. Finally, the two hypotheses are tested using a multilevel ordinal logit analysis of data from the Eurobarometer survey 65.1 (European Commission 2006).

The relation between individual transnationalism and euroscepticism

Aiming at avoiding war between nations, Karl W. Deutsch and colleagues examined how to successfully integrate nations with each other. They argued that existing (national) communities were held together by a high degree of cohesion generated by social, political and economic transactions on the elite and mass levels. Thus, the authors proposed to establish 'security communities' where war between states would no longer be possible due to strong bonds of common identification and trust. The authors distinguish between amalgamated security communities, which largely follow the model of nation-states, and pluralistic ones, which, similarly to the EU, retain independent units of government (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5). More recently, Adler and Barnett (1998: 30) further developed the concept and defined a pluralistic security community as 'a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change'.

In Deutsch's reasoning, security communities are achieved by institutionalising increased cross-border transactions in the form of transnational communication and networks among their members (Deutsch et al. 1957; Deutsch 1969). These transactions are expected to promote a common identity and trust among the population and to lead them to support the newly established political community (Deutsch et al. 1957). To be effective, transactions have to fulfil the following conditions. They should embrace multiple aspects of life, such as flow of capital and labour, scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges and inter-marriage, and they should be consistent and thus predictable over a long-term perspective (Deutsch 1969: 102ff.). Moreover, transactions should be accompanied by compatible values in terms of common decision making (Deutsch et al. 1957: 123). The EU, where cross-border transactions are institutionalised and promoted by a wide array of

European policies such as the Erasmus student exchanges or transeuropean networks of infrastructure, is often seen as a textbook example of such a pluralistic ‘security community’.

Deutsch and colleagues studied the effect of increased transactions between France and Germany on support for further integration and found some support for their theory (Deutsch et al. 1967). Surprisingly, however, little has been done to test these hypotheses in the context of the EU today. A key contribution in this respect is Fligstein’s (2008) *Euroclash*, which brings together findings of increased transactions at the institutional, corporate and individual levels and European identity formation. Equally, Díez-Medrano (2008) studies the relation between Europeanising behaviour and experiences and the development of European social groups. Recchi and Favell (2009), in turn, focus on the small group of intra-EU migrants which they see as harbingers of a European collective identity. Nonetheless, these contributions do not directly test the link between transnational interactions at the individual level and support for European integration. Thus, I seek to fill this gap in the literature by assessing the extent of transnational interaction and networks among Europeans and by analysing its impact on support towards European integration. In what follows, I therefore introduce the concept of ‘individual transnationalism’.

Individual transnationalism

Following Mau and colleagues (Mau et al. 2008: 2), I define individual transnationalism as ‘the extent to which individuals are involved in cross-border interaction and mobility’. It includes all sorts of interactions that go beyond national borders, such as personal relations with foreigners and people living abroad, virtual trips and the use of international media. Hence, it also applies to individuals who remain in their country of origin but are confronted by a transnationalisation of their realm.

I distinguish among three dimensions of individual transnationalism. First, *transnational background* refers to personal traits such as dual citizenship, the fact of being born abroad or belonging to an ethnic minority. Arguably, these characteristics influence whether someone has a transnational outlook or not. *Transnational practices* entail the active, voluntary engagement in contact with non-national actors. It includes stays abroad, relations and regular contacts with non-nationals or people abroad, as well as crossing borders for work, shopping or leisure. Finally, *transnational human capital* refers to knowledge and skills that enable people to perform in a transnational environment. Foreign language skills are a key factor (Gerhards 2010), but the general level

of education and occupation are also crucial. There are, however, considerable differences within the same level of education or occupation. Many lawyers, for example, are limited to the legal system of their state and thus rather immobile despite being highly educated. Equally, low-skilled workers can dispose of transnational human capital if labour is scarce in another country or if they are employable at below-market prices abroad. For this reason, only foreign language skills will be considered as an instance of transnational human capital.

In contrast to what one might expect according to transactionalist theory, even after more than half a century of European integration individual transnationalism is not (yet) a mass-phenomenon in Europe. Büttner and Mau (2010) show that, while transnational interconnectedness across Europe has substantially increased in terms of transportation and communication networks, student exchanges, multinational corporations, tourism and so on, not everyone takes part in these processes. Similarly, Fligstein (2008: 123) argues that while the construction of Europe-wide social fields drives members of different countries routinely to interact with one another, only a small elite actually does so. On the basis of a wide array of secondary data, he concludes that 10–15 per cent of the European population regularly operate on a transnational level and have strong transnational networks. He places about 40–50 per cent of Europeans at the other end of the spectrum – these individuals do not speak any foreign language and remain within the national realm. The rest of the population lies between these two poles, occasionally interacting on a transnational level for professional or private reasons (Fligstein 2008: 250). The number of intra-European migrants is equally low. In 2009, only 2.5 per cent of the European population lived in a EU Member State other than their own (Eurostat 2010). Moreover, recent expulsions of Roma by France and Italy as well as mobility restrictions on citizens of new Member States show that not all Europeans equally enjoy freedom of movement.

Considering the low numbers of transnationally active Europeans, Deutsch might have overestimated the incidence of transnational behaviour rather than its effect on attitudes towards integration. In fact, it is plausible that transnational interactions indeed have a negative impact on euroscepticism – among the few who take part in them. Rother and Nebe (2009) find empirical support for this hypothesis by showing that intra-EU migrants are more prone to have a European identity than stayers. Equally, frequent travellers are significantly more attached to Europe than the rest of the European population (Gustafson 2009). Given that certain transnational interactions, such as cross-border shopping, are more easily carried out when living close to a national border, the findings of Gabel (1998), Díez-Medrano (2003) and Schmidberger (1997) are also telling: their studies found that people living

close to a national border are less prone to be eurosceptical. In a similar vein, Berezin and Díez-Medrano (2008) showed that, as geographical distance from Brussels increases, so does the likelihood of opposing European integration.

In more general terms and beyond the context of European integration, this argument is further supported by intergroup contact theory, which posits that increased contact between social groups fosters mutual understanding and lowers intergroup boundaries (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998; see also Brown 2000). Using data from a representative survey of 2,700 German citizens, Mau et al. (2008) find a positive relation between individual transnationalism (a scale encompassing short- and long-term stays abroad as well as frequent private interactions with people living abroad) and cosmopolitan attitudes with respect to foreigners and global governance. Such attitudes are not only marked by the appreciation of other human beings notwithstanding their national origin (Vertovec & Cohen 2002: 13), but also by the recognition of increased interconnectedness of political communities and the readiness to legitimise international assignment of accountability (Held 2002: 58). These dimensions of cosmopolitanism can also be found in attitudes towards European integration. In this sense, a positive evaluation of European integration entails cosmopolitan attitudes in the way that it refers to the legitimisation of a supranational polity and the acceptance of increased interconnectedness with members of other European countries.

In addition, people interacting on a transnational level might be less prone to be eurosceptical for utilitarian reasons. European integration has given rise to a wide array of opportunities beyond the national system, access to which depends on individuals' exit-options (Bartolini 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). While these are usually captured indirectly by factors such as individuals' socioeconomic background, their comparative advantage in the labour market (Kriesi et al. 2008) or their economic self-assessment (Tucker et al. 2002), I define them more directly in terms of the degree of individual transnationalism. Consequently, transnational individuals are likely to see European integration and globalisation as sources of new opportunities. To the contrary, people who solely operate on the national level might perceive the structural transformations as sources of additional competition.

Competing scenarios are also plausible, however. Individuals interacting on a primarily binational level (e.g., between Sweden and Denmark) might frame their interactions in terms of a binational region rather than the EU (Rother & Nebe 2009). Equally, individuals who are transnational beyond European borders (such as British people maintaining links to the Commonwealth) might develop more global attachments (Savage et al. 2005) and even criticise the 'fortress Europe'.

Bearing these caveats in mind, individual transnationalism is nonetheless expected to have a negative impact on euroscepticism for two main reasons. First, by interacting across national borders, people feel closer to members of other countries and are cognisant of international interdependence. Second, by making use of the exit options provided by European integration, highly transnational people perceive the integration process as a source of new opportunities. People scoring low on transnationalism are not only not triggered by transnational interaction to become pro-European, they also might see European integration a source of additional competition and a challenge to their way of life. Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: The more transnationalised an individual, the less she or he is likely to be eurosceptical.

Globalisation

Transactionalist theory implicitly understands transactions within a ‘security community’ and beyond it as a zero-sum game. Increased transnational interaction within a ‘security community’ is assumed to decrease the propensity to interact with the rest of the world (Inglehart 1968: 121–122). However, European integration should not be seen as an isolated process in an otherwise static world. Rather, it is part and parcel of a greater trend of transnationalisation, which is usually referred to as ‘globalisation’ (Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi 2009). Castells’ oft-cited observation that ‘European integration is, at the same time a reaction to the process of globalisation, and its most advanced expression’ (Castells 2000: 348) suggests that it is impossible to conceive one without the other. In a similar vein, Duchesne and colleagues found that for many Europeans, ‘processes of European integration seem to be diluted in a more engulfing process of global change’ (Duchesne et al. 2010: 70).

The extent to which countries are globalised varies considerably. As Mills and Blossfeld (2005) argue, institutional filters influence the degree to which a country is subject to processes of globalisation. While most European Member States are rather highly globalised, there is considerable variance across the EU. In fact, according to the KOF globalisation index for the year 2006, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands are the most globalised countries worldwide, whereas Latvia is 34th out of 156 countries (Dreher et al. 2008).²

One may be tempted to translate the individual-level hypothesis formulated above to the macro level by stating that the higher the degree of globalisation in a society, the more transnational and thus the less eurosceptical are its members. However, recent developments in Ireland and the Netherlands

– two of the most globalised countries worldwide – are belying this expectation. The negative referendum outcomes in the Netherlands in 2005 and Ireland in 2008 as well as the rise of the Dutch populist right catering to globalisation losers (Kriesi & Frey 2008: 181) strongly suggest that parts of the population reject the transnationalisation of their realm. Indeed, an analysis of Eurobarometer data of the EU-15 from 1994 to 2004 found that euroscepticism increased most notably in the Netherlands (Lubbers & Scheepers 2010). In fact, translating the individual hypothesis to the macro level would bear the risk of committing an ecological fallacy by making inferences about individuals based on aggregate data (Snijders & Bosker 1999). In this sense, Beck (2002: 29) warns against committing the ‘cosmopolitan fallacy’ of believing that ‘we’re all going to become cosmopolitans’ simply because individuals today experience the transnationalisation of their realm. Rather, it seems sensible to speak of a ‘bifurcation of attitudes’ (Roudometof 2005: 127) in the wake of globalisation.

In fact, it is unlikely that globalisation renders all members of a society more transnational. As Hofmeister and Breitenstein (2008: 481) cogently observe, ‘the degree to which a society or nation is engaged in transnationalisation processes can be quite different from the degree to which an individual within that society is engaged’. Even in highly globalised countries, a substantial share of the population continues to operate on a purely local or national level. Two arguments suggest that these individuals might feel threatened by globalisation and the increased transnational social practices of their fellow citizens to an even stronger extent than in countries that are less globalised. First, negative consequences of globalisation such as increased economic and political insecurity might be more pronounced in highly globalised countries. Second, in contrast to European integration, global trends of integration are not framed in terms of a common project (be it to assure peace or economic prospects) and they are hardly backed up by an embracing set of values, institutions or top-down approaches of common identity formation. However, these may well be necessary pre-conditions to obtain public support for further integration (Deutsch 1969). Thus, it is likely that globalisation exacerbates the individual-level relationship between transnational activity and euroscepticism (rather than having a direct effect itself). Therefore, it is important to consider an individual’s degree of transnationalism in interaction with the degree of globalisation at the macro level in order to predict their attitude towards European integration. In statistical terms, I hence expect a negative interaction effect of globalisation and individual transnationalism. I thus propose the following hypothesis:

H2: The more globalised a country, the stronger the relationship between individual transnationalism and euroscepticism.

In this view, euroscepticism can be interpreted as a consequence of lacking individual transnationalism in the wake of globalisation.

Data and method

The above hypotheses will be tested using survey data from Eurobarometer wave 65.1 (European Commission 2006), which was conducted in the (then) 25 EU Member States. It is the only cross-national survey that includes both a wide range of questions regarding European transnational interactions and networks and items tapping attitudes towards European integration. Since the dependent variable has three ordered categories (see below) and given the clustered nature of the data, a multilevel ordinal logit model will be applied.³

Dependent variable

Eurobarometer 65.1 includes the membership support question that is frequently used as an operationalisation of euroscepticism (see, among others, Anderson 1998; Carey 2002; Eichenberg & Dalton 2007). The exact wording of this item is: 'Generally speaking, do you think that our country's membership of the European Union is (1) a good thing, (2) a bad thing, (3) neither good nor bad, (4) don't know?' This item will be used as a dependent variable. As there is a clearly neutral category (3), it has been recoded as the middle category while all respondents indicating 'don't know' have been omitted from the analysis. The recoded dependent variable thus has three ordered categories, with 'bad thing' having the highest value.

Independent variables

The overall transnationalism index is constructed of ten items, listed in Table 1. In order to ascertain that the effect is not exclusively driven by one of the three dimensions of individual transnationalism, I also construct scales for each dimension and I will test their impact in an additional analysis. *Transnational background* is operationalised by the fact of having a nationality other than the country of residence or having parents from abroad.⁴ The dimension of *transnational practices* is operationalised by items referring to long-term stays or short-term visits abroad, frequent socialising with non-nationals as well as cross-border shopping and purchases of foreign products and services. *Transnational human capital* in the form of foreign language proficiency will be captured by the perceived preparedness to buy a product in another EU

Table 1. Operationalisation of individual transnationalism

Dimension	Operationalisation	Item in EB65.1
Transnational background	Nationality other than the country of interview	Q1
	Parent(s) born outside the country of residence	D42
Transnational practices	Have lived abroad or intend to live abroad	QD14
	Have visited another EU country in past 12 months	QA5.1
	Have socialised with non-nationals in past 12 months	QA5.3
	Cross-border shopping	QB2, QD8
	Purchase of insurance/mortgage from abroad	QD15
Transnational human capital	Self-assessed preparedness to buy a product in another EU language	QB21
	Read newspaper, book or magazine in foreign language in past 12 months	QA5.2

language and by having read foreign language texts in the past year.⁵ If *HI* holds true, there is a significant negative association between these scales and the dependent variable.

A Member State's degree of globalisation is operationalised by items of the KOF Index of Globalisation (Dreher et al. 2008) measuring globalisation in 158 countries on a scale from 1 to 100. There are other measures of globalisation such as the Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine globalisation index (Kearney 2001), the CSGR Globalisation index (Lockwood & Redoano 2005) or the GlobalIndex (Raab et al. 2008). However, they either focus primarily on the economic dimension, and are thus less useful for the present research question (Kearney 2001), or they do not cover the time point or countries at stake (Lockwood & Redoano 2005; Raab et al. 2008). In contrast, the KOF globalisation index does not pose these problems and has therefore been chosen as the relevant measure of globalisation.

The KOF index consists of three dimensions: economic, political and social globalisation. The item 'economic globalisation' measures actual economic flows and economic restrictions. The spread of ideas, information, images and people is captured by the variable 'social globalisation'. Finally, 'political globalisation' refers to a country's institutional links with the international community. The weighting of the dimensions is based on structural equation modelling (for a more detailed description, see Dreher et al. 2008). I use the overall KOF globalisation index and interact it with the individual

transnationalism scale. If $H2$ holds true, there is a significant negative association between the cross-level interaction and euroscepticism.

Control variables

Euroscepticism is a widely studied phenomenon and a plethora of explanations have been proposed in the literature. In order to estimate a fully specified model, the following controls have been included. A prominent explanatory approach argues that attitudes towards European integration are based on utilitarian cost-benefit considerations (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Anderson & Reichert 1995; Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998). In a nutshell, people well endowed with human capital are the likely winners of European integration and thus welcome it. Consequently, the respondents' socioeconomic background is controlled by their current occupation (managers as reference category). Additionally, having left school at age 15 or younger is coded as 'low education'; 'medium education' refers to having left school between 16 and 19, while 'high' refers to having quit education at 20 or later. A fourth variable refers to respondents without any full-time education. Tucker et al. (2002) argue that individuals' subjective economic situation is more important than their objective position. Therefore, a five-category item referring to one's self-assessed household situation in two years' time accounts for self-rated economic prospects. The cognitive mobilisation hypothesis (Inglehart 1970; Karp et al. 2003) is accounted for by the ability to convince friends and by the habit of discussing politics. Since it has been argued that dissatisfaction with domestic politics spills over to attitudes on European politics (Franklin et al. 1995; Anderson 1998; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005), I control for the assessment of the domestic status-quo ('things are going in the (1) right, (2) neither right not wrong, (3) wrong direction in our country'). To account for a potential effect of anti-immigrant feelings on euroscepticism (De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2006; Lubbers & Scheepers 2007), I control for having indicated 'encouraging immigration of workers from outside the EU' as a measure to solve potential shortages in the workforce. Admittedly, this item measures pro- rather than anti-immigrant attitudes. However, it is the only measure referring to immigration in the survey.

A ten-category item referring to left-right self-placement measures political ideology. Given that extreme-right positioning is highly correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes (Semyonov et al. 2006), it is likely to pick up further effects of anti-immigrant attitudes that are not accounted for by the item above. Since in some countries, the effect of ideology is curvilinear rather than linear (Steenbergen et al. 2007; Lubbers & Scheepers 2010), its square is also included. Three dummy variables ('rural area', 'middle-sized town' or 'city')

control for respondents' residence. I account for age using four age group categories, with the category '55+' as reference, and for gender by a dummy variable for being female. Previous findings would suggest controlling for respondents' trust in political institutions (Rohrschneider 2002) or the exclusivity of their national identity (Carey 2002; Hooghe & Marks 2004; Luedtke 2005; McLaren 2007). Unfortunately, it is impossible to do so at the individual level because these items are not included in the survey.

However, to account for nationalist stances at the macro level (which are likely to reflect public opinion), I include two variables referring to political parties' positions on a cosmopolitanism versus nationalism dimension and the relative importance parties ascribe to this dimension. These items are drawn from the Chapel Hill expert survey for the year 2006 (Hooghe et al. 2010). To account for party cues directly referring to European integration (Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al. 2007; De Vries & Edwards 2009), I also include the country-average party positions towards European integration and the relative importance of European integration in the parties' stances (Hooghe et al. 2010). Each of these items was weighted by the percentage of votes the parties received in the last election and averaged for each country. I further control for GDP per capita (Eurostat 2009a), inflation rate (Eurostat 2009b), unemployment rate (Eurostat 2009c) as well as a country's share of EU trade in international trade (Eurostat 2009d, 2009e) as they have been shown to structure public opinion on European integration (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, 2007). Additionally, a dummy variable controls for being in one of the EU-15 Member States.⁶

All independent and control variables have been standardised to range from 0 to 1 so as to make them comparable and to simplify interpretation of the constitutive terms of the interactions (see Appendix Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Analyses were carried out twice: once by excluding all observations with missing values from the analysis, and once using Stata's multiple imputation technique *ice* ($m = 5$) for all independent and control variables. These two options did not yield substantially different results. Since not all post-estimation analyses could be applied to the imputed data, the analyses based on the original data are presented here.

Results

Individual transnationalism

With a mean of 0.23 on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, the transnationalism scale is considerably skewed towards the left. In other words, only a small part of the population is highly transnational, while the majority display low

levels of transnationalism. When distinguishing between different age groups (Figure 1), levels of education⁷ (Figure 2) and occupation (not shown here), we see that individual transnationalism is considerably stratified along these lines. Generally speaking, older and less educated Europeans engage much




Figure 1. Transnationalism by age groups.




Figure 2. Transnationalism by education.

less in transnational networks and practices than the younger and better educated.

It is also interesting to look at variation in individual transnationalism across countries (Figure 3). The population of Luxembourg clearly stands out, with its least transnational respondents having a higher score than the mean of many other countries. Given the small size of Luxembourg and its important role in international banking, finance and politics, this finding is not surprising. Luxembourg is followed by two other small countries: the Netherlands and Denmark. The three least transnationally active societies are Hungary, Spain and Portugal. This might be explained not only by the relatively low GDP, but also by the peripheral position of Spain and Portugal, which renders some forms of transnationalism more costly. The graph further shows that in most countries, the distribution is skewed towards low levels of transnationalism.

Appendix Table 2 shows the results of the multilevel analyses. The models are constructed in a stepwise manner, including first the independent variables on the individual level in models 1 and 2, then adding the higher level variables in model 3, and finally including the cross-level interaction in model 4. The results in Appendix Table 2 confirm *HI* by showing that individual transnationalism is negatively associated with euroscepticism. Its coefficient remains significant at the 0.001 level after including the higher level variables as well. In models 1 and 3, it accounts for the strongest effect in the entire model. When including the three dimensions of transnationalism in




Figure 3. Transnationalism across countries.

the analysis instead of the overall scale (model 2), all three dimensions have a significant coefficient, with transnational practices having the strongest effect. This finding is interesting with respect to the direction of causality: in contrast to transnational practices, transnational background cannot be influenced by attitudes towards European integration. The same applies, to a lesser extent, to transnational human capital, which is often acquired during childhood and adolescence. This suggests that there is a causal link from individual transnationalism to euroscepticism even though there may additionally be some effect in the other direction in the case of transnational practices. Additional analyses that are not presented here found that the predicted probabilities for answering 'country membership of the EU is a bad thing' decrease as individual transnationalism increases. Taken together, these findings strongly support *H1*.

Interaction effect of macro-level transnationalisation

H2 states that the negative effect of transnationalism on euroscepticism is even more pronounced in countries with high levels of globalisation. To test this hypothesis, I include a cross-level interaction of the individual transnationalism scale with the globalisation index in model 3. As shown in the model, the interaction term is significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the negative association between individual transnationalism and euroscepticism is significantly stronger in countries that score high on the globalisation index.

The coefficients of the constitutive terms of the interaction refer to the marginal effect of this item if all other constitutive terms are held at zero (Brambor et al. 2006). Model 4 reveals a negative, highly significant coefficient for the individual transnationalism scale. Hence, if the index of globalisation is held at zero, individual transnationalism has a negative significant effect with an effect size of -1.27 . By adding the interaction term, we obtain the marginal effect of individual transnationalism when the globalisation index is held at its maximum. Thus, in a highly globalised country, the marginal effect of individual transnationalism is 2.208. Consequently, in highly globalised countries, transnationalism has the strongest effect in the entire model, while in low globalised countries, only dissatisfaction about domestic politics has a stronger effect. This strongly supports the hypothesis that the individual effect of transnationalism is stronger the higher the degree of globalisation. Figure 4 further clarifies this relation by visualising the marginal effect of individual transnationalism for the complete range of the globalisation index following Brambor et al. (2006). The solid line in the figure shows how a one-standard-deviation increase in transnationalism (from its mean) affects the probability of being eurosceptical across the observed range of the globalisation index. We can see that transnationalism




Figure 4. Marginal effect of individual transnationalism on euroscepticism.

significantly decreases the probability of being eurosceptical, and that this effect is stronger with higher levels of globalisation. This again supports *H2*.

To ascertain that the interaction effect between globalisation and individual transnationalism is not due to unexplained country-level variance, and since levels of transnationalism vary across countries, I conducted an additional ordinal logit analysis with dummies for each country and robust standard errors (results not shown here). In this analysis, as well, both hypotheses were strongly supported.

Effects of control variables

Overall, the coefficients of the control variables support previous findings.⁸ Education is a strong predictor of attitudes towards European integration, with better educated people being less eurosceptical. Equally, those in higher job positions and people positively assessing their economic prospects are less likely to be eurosceptical. The respondent's assessment of domestic politics has a highly significant and very strong effect: the lower one's satisfaction with national politics, the greater the likelihood to be eurosceptical. Equally, attitudes towards immigrants have a highly significant effect on euroscepticism. The 40–54 age cohort is significantly more eurosceptical than the 55+ reference cohort.⁹ In line with the hypothesis of cognitive mobilisation, the habit of

discussing politics is negatively associated with euroscepticism. City dwellers are significantly less prone to be eurosceptical than people living in a rural area. With respect to ideology in terms of left-right self-placement, neither a linear nor a curvilinear relationship was found.

Regarding the country-level control variables, only a country's unemployment rate had a significant effect on euroscepticism: the higher the unemployment rate in one's country, the less likely is a respondent to be eurosceptical. This is in line with previous findings by Lubbers and Scheepers (2010), who also found a negative association between unemployment and euroscepticism. An explanation of this finding might be that the unemployment rate is highest in the two new Member States Poland (13.9 per cent) and Slovakia (13.4 per cent) whose populations might put their hopes in a European labour market. Neither belonging to an old Member State (EU15) nor party positions on European integration and immigration issues had a significant effect.

Discussion and conclusion

After more than fifty years of European integration, have I found empirical support for Deutsch and colleagues' (1957) hypothesis that increased transnational interaction promotes support towards European integration? I have tried to answer this question here by analysing the impact of individual transnationalism and globalisation on euroscepticism. Individual transnationalism was conceptualised as a three-dimensional phenomenon encompassing transnational background, transnational practices and transnational human capital, whereas data from the KOF index of globalisation were used to measure globalisation in the EU-25 countries. The hypothesis (*H1*) that individual transnationalism is negatively associated with euroscepticism was strongly supported. Individual transnationalism accounted for the strongest effect in the entire model. Moreover, the effect holds for each dimension of individual transnationalism. This evidence leads me to conclude that individuals who are more transnational are less prone to be eurosceptical. Equally, *H2* is also supported: The individual-level relationship is even stronger in more globalised countries.

The findings of this article should be seen in the light of some limitations. First, since cross-sectional data only allow me to make between-individual comparisons, I cannot be sure that, as individuals change their degree in transnationalism, they also become less eurosceptical. Moreover, there is the possibility of reversed causation. I alleviated this problem by estimating the effect of each dimension of individual transnationalism separately in model

2. This allowed me to isolate the effect of transnational background (which cannot be predicted by attitudes) on euroscepticism. The fact that transnational background does have a significant negative effect indicates that there is a causal link from individual transnationalism to euroscepticism.

Second, it should also be noted that a prominent explanatory factor of euroscepticism – exclusive national identity – could not be directly controlled in the present dataset. Given that individual transnationalism is likely to be negatively correlated with nationalist stances, I cannot rule out the possibility that the effect of individual transnationalism is spurious to exclusive national identity. I tried to address this problem in two ways. First, as exclusive national identities are closely related to perceived threat by immigrants, I included an item tapping attitudes towards immigrants at the individual level. Second, using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al. 2010), I referred to party stances on a nationalist versus cosmopolitan values dimension that may spark (and reflect) nationalist feelings among the public. Moreover, the potential correlation between exclusive national identity and individual transnationalism should not be overstated. After all, nationalist sentiments do not preclude transnational interactions from occurring for purely utilitarian reasons.

Finally, even in the case that the effect is partly spurious, the present analysis contributes to the scholarly debate on euroscepticism by opening up the black box of the abstract concept of collective identities. By referring to actual behaviour and networks rather than the feeling of being exclusively attached to the nation-state, this research has shed light on the mechanisms underlying this relationship.

Bearing these caveats in mind, what do the findings of this analysis suggest with respect to Deutsch's transactionalist theory? The individual-level relationship between transnationalism and euroscepticism as such does support his theory. However, it was also shown that individual transnationalism in Europe today is not a mainstream phenomenon but rather highly stratified along educational attainment, age and occupational background. Only a small share of Europeans displays high levels of transnationalism while the majority remain within the borders of their nation-state. These latter not only fail to be prompted by transnational interaction to endorse the integration process, but also might perceive the increased transnationalisation of their realm as a threat to their way of life. This is even more the case as Europeans witness a broader trend of globalisation which creates tensions in national societies. Thus, for Deutsch's theory to become reality in the EU today, it is not that the total amount of transactions needs to be increased, but rather that a broader share of the population ought to be involved.

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Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Descriptive statistics before standardisation

Variable	Range	Mean
<i>Individual-level variables*</i>		
Membership support	1–3	1.63
Individual transnationalism	8–29	13.11
Transnational background	0–2	0.13
Transnational practices	6–20	9.30
Transnational human capital	2–7	3.69
Female	0–1	0.53
Age groups		
Age 15–24	0–1	0.11
Age 25–39	0–1	0.25
Age 40–54	0–1	0.25
Age 55+	0–1	0.39
Education		
No full-time education	0–1	0.01
Low	0–1	0.19
Medium	0–1	0.41
High	0–1	0.32
Current occupation		
Manager	0–1	0.12
Self-employed	0–1	0.07
White collar	0–1	0.12
Manual worker	0–1	0.20
House person	0–1	0.08
Unemployed	0–1	0.06
Retired	0–1	0.28
Student	0–1	0.08

Appendix Table 1. Continued.

Variable	Range	Mean
Left-right placement	1–10	5.42
Dissatisfaction with domestic politics	1–3	1.94
Self-rated economic prospects	1–5	2.68
Immigration attitudes	0–1	0.89
Convince others	0–4	2.67
Discuss politics	2–6	3.90
Rural area	0–1	0.35
Middle-sized town	0–1	0.38
City	0–1	0.27
<i>Macro-level variables</i>		
KOF Index of Globalisation**	76.14–91.51	83.81
EU-15 member*	0–1	0.67
Structural indicators [†]		
GDP	52.30–267.00	102.80
Inflation	1.30–6.60	2.60
Unemployment rate	3.90–13.90	7.34
EU trade share	59.10–83.10	69.29
Party positions ^{††}		
Position on EU issues	29.83–119.83	–72.46
EU salience	16.21–65.88	37.28
Party nationalism	33.07–102.87	71.59
Salience of nationalism	35.86–131.86	74.34

Note: N = 16,603.

Sources: * European Commission (2006); ** Dreher et al. (2008); † Eurostat (2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e); †† Hooghe et al. (2010).

Appendix Table 2. Multilevel ordinal logit models: Impact of individual transnationalism and globalisation on euroscepticism

	Model 1 Individual transnationalism			Model 2 Three dimensions of transnationalism			Model 3 Macro-level controls			Model 4 Cross-level interaction		
	b	se		b	se		b	se		b	se	
Individual transnationalism (TN)	-1.765***	(0.113)					-1.760***	(0.113)		-1.270***	(0.211)	
TN background				-0.262**	(0.094)							
TN practices				-1.037***	(0.111)							
TN human capital				-0.510***	(0.068)							
Globalisation							-0.678	(0.528)		-0.393	(0.637)	
TN* Globalisation										-0.938**	(0.341)	
<i>Individual-level controls</i>												
Female	0.085*	(0.034)		0.087*	(0.034)		0.085*	(0.034)		0.086*	(0.034)	
Age groups												
Age 15-24	-0.091	(0.088)		-0.086	(0.088)		-0.092	(0.088)		-0.105	(0.088)	
Age 25-39	0.115*	(0.057)		0.117*	(0.057)		0.114*	(0.057)		0.110	(0.057)	
Age 40-54	0.178***	(0.052)		0.178***	(0.052)		0.177***	(0.052)		0.176***	(0.052)	
Age 55+	ref.			ref.			ref.			ref.		
Education												
No full-time education	0.819***	(0.233)		0.814***	(0.233)		0.817***	(0.233)		0.819***	(0.233)	
Low	0.543***	(0.055)		0.539***	(0.056)		0.542***	(0.055)		0.544***	(0.055)	
Medium	0.302***	(0.043)		0.298***	(0.043)		0.302***	(0.043)		0.304***	(0.043)	
High	ref.			ref.			ref.			ref.		

Appendix Table 2. Continued.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Individual transnationalism		Three dimensions of transnationalism		Macro-level controls		Cross-level interaction	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Current occupation								
Self-employed	0.213**	(0.081)	0.210**	(0.081)	0.213**	(0.081)	0.212**	(0.081)
White collar worker	0.196**	(0.071)	0.194**	(0.071)	0.196**	(0.071)	0.195**	(0.071)
Manual worker	0.355***	(0.064)	0.350***	(0.065)	0.355***	(0.064)	0.355***	(0.064)
House person	0.325***	(0.082)	0.323***	(0.082)	0.326***	(0.082)	0.327***	(0.082)
Unemployed	0.434***	(0.084)	0.433***	(0.085)	0.435***	(0.084)	0.437***	(0.084)
Retired	0.222**	(0.072)	0.221**	(0.072)	0.222**	(0.072)	0.221**	(0.072)
Student	0.228*	(0.103)	0.232*	(0.103)	0.228*	(0.103)	0.230*	(0.103)
Manager	ref.		ref.		ref.		ref.	
Left-right scale	-0.518	(0.272)	-0.524	(0.272)	-0.506	(0.272)	-0.516	(0.272)
Left-right scale squared	0.236	(0.261)	0.237	(0.261)	0.224	(0.262)	0.238	(0.261)
Dissatisfaction domestic politics	1.515***	(0.039)	1.514***	(0.039)	1.515***	(0.039)	1.516***	(0.039)
Self-rated economic prospects	0.570***	(0.093)	0.568***	(0.093)	0.571***	(0.093)	0.577***	(0.093)
Immigration attitudes	0.519***	(0.057)	0.515***	(0.057)	0.519***	(0.057)	0.517***	(0.057)
Convince others	-0.003	(0.056)	-0.005	(0.056)	-0.004	(0.056)	-0.005	(0.056)
Discuss politics	-0.388***	(0.059)	-0.386***	(0.059)	-0.388***	(0.059)	-0.389***	(0.059)

Residence							
Rural area	ref.						
Middle-sized town	-0.076*	(0.038)	-0.072	(0.038)	-0.077*	(0.038)	-0.079*
City	-0.183***	(0.043)	-0.174***	(0.043)	-0.183***	(0.043)	-0.187***
<i>Macro-level controls</i>							
EU-15 member					0.064	(0.332)	0.067
Inflation rate					-0.761	(0.637)	-0.787
GDP					-0.994	(0.825)	-0.920
Unemployment rate					-1.290**	(0.452)	-1.191*
Intra-EU trade					0.614	(0.511)	0.517
Party positions on EU					-0.120	(0.993)	-0.069
EU salience					0.048	(1.359)	0.110
Party nationalism					-0.505	(0.934)	-0.688
Salience of nationalism					0.659	(0.873)	0.680
T1	1.277***	(0.168)	1.266***	(0.168)	0.346	(1.205)	0.443
T2	3.319***	(0.170)	3.308***	(0.170)	2.387*	(1.205)	2.485
Country-level constant	0.549***	(0.080)	0.548***	(0.080)	0.524***	(0.050)	0.499***
Log-likelihood	-14304.5		-14302.8		-14301.8		-14297.7
AIC	28663.0		28663.6		28677.6		28671.5

Note: Two-tailed test. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Sources: European Commission (2006); Eurostat (2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e); Dreher et al. (2008); Hooghe et al. (2010).

Notes

1. Drawing on Easton's (1965) concept of 'political support', I define 'euroscepticism' as lacking support for European integration and the institutions emerging from it.
2. Note that the rankings have been recently updated and can be accessed online at: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2009.pdf
3. Models were estimated using the Gllamm package in Stata. A generalised ordered logit model showed that the parallel regression assumption was not violated. Results of a multilevel logistic model, coding 'bad thing' as 1 and the two other categories as 0, did not differ substantially from those presented here.
4. To be sure, this dimension is closely related to being an immigrant, and one might argue that other mechanisms are at stake. However, the majority of respondents with transnational background are not third-country nationals, but intra-EU migrants. This group of migrants has been shown to become increasingly well educated and heterogeneous, often motivated by lifestyle preferences, rather than low-skilled labour migrants (Favell 2008; Recchi & Favell 2009).
5. The reliability statistics are as follows: overall transnationalism index: Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.75$, KMO = 0.81; transnational practices: Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.68$, KMO = 0.74; transnational human capital: Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.65$, KMO = 0.5. Loewinger's coefficient (Hjk) for transnational background = 0.78.
6. In additional analyses that are not shown here, this variable was replaced by a control variable referring to a country's length of membership and a dummy variable for Eurozone membership (due to high collinearity, these items were not included simultaneously). Results were not substantially different from the ones presented here.
7. For a better visualisation, the categories 'no full-time education' and 'left school at age 15 or lower' have been combined into the category 'low education'.
8. Given the high number of observations, only coefficients with a p-value at the 0.01 level or lower will be discussed.
9. This may be due to a life-course effect. People in this age group tend to be less flexible and more sensitive in terms of economic insecurity: they might still have to support their children, pay off mortgages and so on.

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